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THE COUNTRY LAWYER.
Address by

IV. U HENSEL,
Before the Shars-zvood Club of the Laz School of the University of Pennsylvania, at its Twenty-seventh Annual
Dinner, at the Bellevue-Stratford, Philadelphia, on
Saturday, April 16, 19io.
[Mr. Hensel was the guest of the Sharswood Club at
its annual dinner in 1909. Owing to a misunderstanding he
anticipated only a call upon him for a brief, informal response to a toast, whereas he was announced on the program
to deliver "the annual address." In the course of his offhand remarks then he referred to the fact that if he had
understood the nature of his appointment he would have
been glad to read to the club a paper on "The Country Lawyer", whereupon he was unanimously requested to adopt
that topic and make the address at the annual dinner in
1910.]
Mr.Toastmasterand Gentlemen: It is seldom one is taken
at his own valuation. When I jocosely proposed myself
a year ago for re-election as your guest I thought I knew
enough of the unwritten law oi this association to suspect
a second term was odious to it. The suggestion, however,
(521)
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was taken seriously. You are like the persistent suitor in
"Punch", who, when lie stammeringly announced to the
prospective father-in-law, "I wish to marry your daughter";
got the cautious reply: "Well, my boy, hadn't you better
see her mother first?" The undeterred swain promptly
followed it up with: "I have, sir, and-er--er-I still
wish to marry your daughter."
So it happens "I'm with you once again", rather by
your own favor than by any deliberate contrivance of mine.
Nor have I choice of subject. That was unanimously
elected at the same time; and I trust that a twelve-month
has not staled its interest, even if I am not able in a brief
sketch to present its "infinite variety".
To an association whose title bespeaks the deserved admiration of its members for an eminent jurist, who was
peculiarly a "city lawyer"; and to a company composed
largely of those whose professional experiences have run
or are expected to run on lines of metropolitan practice, it
may be grateful, as the time for summer recreation approaches, to ramble through the green pastures and by the
still waters of a country lawyer's practice.
I am not at all insensible to the fact that with the highly
developed efficiency of transportation and communication,
with railroads, telephones, telegrapfis, newspapers and automobiles bringing every section of the commonwealth into
close touch-bridging space, annihilating time and erasing
geographic lines-country really "isn't country any more."
Contemplating especially the three vocations we used to
call "the learned professions", the country lawyer, being
located mostly at county seats or in considerable centres of
vopulation, has not even lasted with the country preacher
or the country doctor; but during the two centuries that
have elapsed since the proprietary owned a wilderness three
hundred miles long and one hundred and fifty miles broad,
and during a very considerable part of the time since law
reports began to be published, there has been a highly interesting series of questions considered and determined by the
courts, which the members of the profession whose experi-
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ence is limited to city practice seldom encounter. Indeed,
many of them are altogether passing away, as the notable
race of strong men who grappled with them in the past is
gradually becoming extinct. They nevertheless exercised
and developed the best faculties of the legal mind; they
engaged the attention and challenged the conflict of many
rare intellects, and out of their study and settlement was
bred a line of lawyers and judges, who-with all deference
to the traditional "Philadelphia lawyer"-have, with him,
largely helped to illustrate the highest attainments and to
accomplish the most enduring triumphs of the Pennsylvania
bar and bench.
Mr. Fiske points out that the fundamental difference between the political basis of Teutonic and Graeco-Roman
civilization is that whereas in the Teutonic system civic
communities never held the foremost position, the failure
of the Greek and Roman political systems was largely due
to their exaltation of the idea of the city. Mr. Jefferson,
it will be remembered, expressed an utterly exaggerated significance of rural life and experience, and grossly overrated the national danger from the growth of cities; but it
is likely true that some of the differences between the ideas
that have been cherished by opposing parties in this country
was due to temperamental differences betveen the founder
of one, who came to public position from the counting
room, and the father of the other, who came from the plantation. We have long since ceased to regard the etymology
of "urbanity" and "politeness"-just as the nation no
longer is restricted to two ideals-"the man on horseback",
and "the man in his shirt sleeves".
ORIGINAL LAND TITLES.

Likewise to an exceptional degree among the early
commonwealths Pennsylvania was dominated by its metropolis, capital and chief city of the country. But with the
controversy that arose in the settlement and improvement of
the interior over boundary lines and the unending disputes
grouped tinder the subject of "Original Titles," came the
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characteristic land lawyer, who mingled woodcraft with
mathematics and often exhibited a range of learning, a subtlety of distinction and power of advocacy, a knowledge of
men and locality, of mineral and organic life, and a profundity of legal learning that found no narrower range of exercise than prevailed in the branches of practice which more
particularly demanded and engaged the attention of the city
lawyer. Nowadays when titles throughout the commonwealth have been generally settled and what were once vast
areas of wild land-scarcely worth their taxes, and often
sold to pay them-have become the consolidated holdings of
great corporate interests working or retaining them for the
development of their natural resources, the occasion that
called out the rural "land lawyer" has passed. He was an
entirely different man from the "real estate lawyer" of
Philadelphia. The cleavage that once marked the profession and cases is growing indistinct. But for nearly a hun-

dred years and through nearly two hundred volumes of
Pennsylvania reports are to be found a highly romantic
series of cases and succession of questions almost linzited
to the interior localities and to practitioners at what might
be called the "country bar."
There is little occasion for the legal novitiate, whose client
will readily allow him $x5 or $2o for the purchase of a title
insurance, to know the significance of what even to some of
his elders might sound as the jargon of "living witnesses"
and "bench marks," "a block of stirveys," "a tier of warrants," "calls, marks and monuments;" but the story of
that litigation is a most important part of the history of
Pennsylvania. Three generations of astute lawyers engaged
in it with a zeal that reached the high water mark of professional achievement, howbeit some' of them were not
familiar with ground rents, party walls and mechanics' liens.
How the old surveyors made their ways over, through and
around hills and swamps, by thicket and forest, with rude
instruments and imperfect tools of measurement, blazing
their paths on the trunks of tree, is told almost romantically in the land cases, which "reduced' general and inde-
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scriptive expressions to a fixed certainty." How warrant,
survey and patent were related back to the application; how
the inchoate right of entry drew it to legal possession; how
conflicting rights were determined by priority of warrant
or the date of the legal survey; how locations were shifted
from one bank of the creek or one side of a hill to the other;
the story of the "lottery applications," title by improvement
and settlement, or based on Indian purchase; the distinction
between straight level measurement and the surface measurement over bills and uneven grounds; the vacancies and the
overlapping of conflicting surveys; marsh lands and fast
lands; whether a bunch of logs, skillfully framed at a corner
which called for an old beaver dam, was the carpentry of
man or of the sagacious and skillful wild animal; the relative
certainty of roads, streams and trees as monuments-are
phases of a great body of law, which an applicant for admission to the bar of the Supreme Court may now disregard
without fear and of which even a justice of that high jurisdiction may confess himself ignorant without reproach.
COAL, GAS AND OIL RIGHTS.

The beloved ex-Chief Justice, whose term has just expired, in the last of many felicitous and reminiscent speeches
and papers, stated what has no doubt been the experience
of many who occupied high place on the bench and many
others who were or are in the first rank at the bar. In his
notable "farewell address" at Pittsburgh, in December, he
said: "Coming to the Supreme Court city bred and having
had an apprenticeship of seventeen years in the District
Court and Court of Common Pleas No. 2 of Philadelphia,
two of the busiest courts in the Commonwealth, I felt fairly
at home in questions incident to city life and industries.
But it did not take long to find out that big as Philadelphia
was, Pennsylvania was bigger yet. Western Pennsylvania,
especially, in its phenomenal development was raising a crop
of new questions about timber and lumber rights, mining
rights and mining conduct, oil rights, gas rights, torts inci-
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dent to oil and gas production, leases and options, royalties
and forfeitures, and others, many as difficult as they were
important. One case made a special impression on me,
where the owner of land had granted the whole body of
coal without reservation, and subsequently having a hope
that he might find oil or gas under it was puzzled to know
if the common law doctrine of ways of necessity wouldn't
enable him to get at it. As was said, there had been more
deep wells bored in Western Pensylvania within a few years
than in all the world in all previous history, and the new
development brought new questions enough to puzzle a
Philadelphia lawyer."
So it was generally that in the development of the natural
resources of the State a great variety of questions arosefirst, because the increase in value of timber, the requireinents of railroads, the discovery of oil and the development
of coal made vital the disputes over boundary lines of valuable property; and, secondly, the processes of development
involved wholly new problems-to be tested and settled,
however, by analogy with old principles of law and equity.
The particular case to which Chief Justice Mitchell refers
[Chartiers Block Coal Co. v. Mellon, 152 Pa., 286], has

always been, to my mind, one of the most interesting in the
reports and illustrative of several phases of the theme upon
which I am endeavoring to fix your attention.
The fact that it was argued by Pittsburgh counsel, and
not by what might be strictly classed as "country lawyers,"
suggests that as to what were once rural interests, the development of the soil or the unlocking of its treasures came
to require vast corporate consolidations of capital and their
legal direction shifted to the large cities-Pittsburgh especially centralizing much of the coal, coke, oil and natural
gas litigation. The populous centres of the anthracite region,
like Wilkes-Barre, Scranton, Sunbury 'and Pottsville, also
produced a typically strong race of practitioners, who mingled many of the best characteristics and high abilities of
both country and city lawyers and took notable rank at the
State bar and in the courts.
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The Coal Companies and Mellon's cases also illustrate how
readily new discoveries of rich physical resources raise novel
questions for litigation. Chief Justice Paxson opens his discussion of the case leading up to the unanimous judgment
of the court with the words: "This is a case of first impression;" and, he continues, "of very grave importance."
Later he said: "This is a new question and full of difficulty." The owner of the surface had parted with the coal,
and the grantee had all the essential mining privileges.
Neither foresaw a rich underlay of oil and gas; and when
other lessees for these later and lower purposes began to
drill, the coal companies sought equitable protection, even to
the extent of prohibition. This was measurably refusedwhich is not of so much importance from our present viewpoint as some general observations which occur in the
opinion of the Chief Justice: "The discovery of new sources
of wealth, and the springing up of new industries which
were never dreamed of half a century ago, sometimes present questions to which it is difficult to apply the law, as it
has heretofore existed. It is the crowning merit of the common law, however, that it is not composed of ironclad rules,
but may be modified to a reasonable extent to meet new
questions as they arise. This may be called the expansive
property of the common law."
He goes on to contrast the changed conditions from the
time when a man "who owned the surface owned all that
grew upon it and all that was buried beneath it," and his
"title extended upward to the clouds and downward to the
earth's centre" until advanced geology, mineralogy and machinery had so changed the uses and values of land that
forest was succeeded by farm, fertile fields underlaid with
coal, and under them all vast cauldrons of oil and retorts
of gas.
Mr. Justice Williams, who was a very able land lawyer, of
large experience, in a concurring opinion expressed his
willingness to go even farther than the chief in denying to
the owner of the coal interference with the owner of the
soil from getting out his underlying oil and gas. He said,
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with the concurrence of two of his colleagues: "I would
lay lown the broad proposition that the several layers of
strata composing the earth's crust, are by virtue of their
order and arrangement subject to reciprocal servitudes; and
as these are imposed by the laws of nature, and are indispensable to the preservation and enjoyment of the several
layers or strata to and from which they are due. the courts
should recognize and enforce them. When the servitude is
the result of natural forces affecting the conformation of
the surface the courts have taken notice of it and enforced
it for and against adjoining owners. Thus, the owner of
land crossed by a stream has a right, as against the owner
above him, to insist on the delivery of the stream to him
within its natural channel; and he is in turn bound to receive
it from such upper owner. He is under a like duty to deliver it to the owner below him, and has a like right to insist
that such owner shall shall receive it from him. The true
foundation on which the relative rights and duties of these
several owners must rest is not found in the order of their
respective purchases, nor in the terms of the conveyances
under which they take title. It is not found in any statute
regulating the flow of streams or the duties of riparian
owners. It is found in the character of the surface over
which the stream flows, and the operation of the laws of
gravity upon the water of the stream."
The judicial notice which he takes later in his opinion
of the importance of the oil development in the State, is
highly interesting; it suggests the importance of preserving
in the appellate jurisdictions a well balanced representation
of different localities and of members of the court with a
wide range of practical experience, as well as the legal
learning of the chamber.
In Lillibridge v. Lackawanna Coal Company [x43 Pa.,
293], it will be remembered that a three to four decision of
the Supreme Court held that the space underground remains
in the grantee and does not revert to the grantor until all
the coal granted shall have been removed. This was an
action brought by the grantor to restrain the grantee from
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n-ing a passageway through the granted coal vein to other
property of the grantee, on the ground that the coal only
and not the space had been granted. It was held that the
space remained in the grantee as long as there was any coal
remaining in the tract and while it was necessary to the
grantee's use.
Vhether or not coal was realty or personalty when
brought up from the mine and thrown upon the earth in a
mound mixed with the dirt, and in its original condition,
was an important question determined in Lehigh Coal Co.
v. WVilkesbarre and Eastern Railroad Company [187 Pa.,
145]. It was decided that coal in such a state was personalty, although not entirely severed from the soil, following
an earlier like ruling with regard to iron ore.
In the frequent litigation which grew out of the famous
Cornwall iron ore estates, in Lebanon County, and the novel
schemes of their ownership, management and control, originated numerous cases such as Coleman v. Coleman [19 Pa.,
Ioo]; Coleman v. Grubb [23 Pa., 394]; Coleman's and
Grubb's Appeals [62 Pa., 252], and the Robesonia Furnace
case. Many curious lawsuits engaged the mingled services
of the keenest intellects of the country, as well as the city
bar-such names as McMurtrie, Penrose, Biddle, Meredith
and Strong being associated with Black, Hughes, Kunkel,
Kline, Reynolds, Slaymaker and Weidman. Judge Woodward delivered the opinion of the court in some cases, and
Judge Sharswood in others, and both drew largely on their
wide range of land and mining law.
The Supreme Court early in the development of oil was
asked to decide to whom belonged the natural gas and oil
deposits in Western Pennsylvania, and whether the owner
of land had an action against his neighbor because a drilled
well drew the oil from his land. In Westmoreland Natural
Gas Co. v. DeWitt [130 Pa., 235], oil and gas were put upon
the footing of percolating streams of water; they belonged
to the owner of the well to which they flowed, irrespective
of where they originated.
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The interpretation of oil, coal and gas leases propounded
the question settled in Dunhant and Shortt v. Kirkpatrick
[iox Pa., 36], in which a reservation of "all minerals" in a
grant did not include petroleum, notwithstanding scientists
and lexicographers held contrary. The court reasoned on
the ground that in a technical sense all land was composed
of minerals, and, therefore, the reservation must be as
comprehensive as the grant. The word "minerals" was interpreted in the light and under the circumstances of the contract, which did not include oil in such classification.
In Funk v. Haldeinan [53 Pa., 229], Chief Justice Woodward had treated oil as a mineral, admittirig that with an
increase of scientific knowledge different classification might
ensue. He said: "If a mineral, it is part of the land; and
a right to take land or any part of land is not, strictly speaking, an incorporeal hereditament. Nor is the right tn fire
bote, or plow bote or turves; and yet, for the want of a
better classification, this is treated in law as an incorporeal
interest. To the same head is to be referred these oil
rights."
Of water, oil and gas it was said in Bro-win v. Vandegrift
[8o Pa., 147], by Agnew, who eminently had the training
of the country bar: "Their fugitive and wandering existence within the limits. of a particular tract is uncertain."
In Gas Co. v. DelVitt [130 Pa., 249], Justice Mitchell, who
had already become a good "country judge," introduced
what he called the fanciful analogy" of "minerals ferce
nature." Petroleum and gas were finally fixed as minerals
in Marshall v. Mellon [79 Pa., 371]; and in Light &
Heat Co. v. Elk County [I91 Pa., 468], surface rights
and gas rights were made divisible for purposes of taxation.
THE LAW OF WATER RIGHTS.

In the earlier days of rural development the grist mill and
its accompanying water power were subjects of great domestic concern. The more or less sluggish streams that
wound themselves through the rich farm lands of Pennsyl-
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vania vere harnessed at every succeeding level to the water
wheel; and the rights of riparian owners, or of the superior
and lower mill dams, were constantly the subject of invasion
and defense. The earlier reports especially attest the frequent battles of the local legal giants over these issues. As
early as Hoy v. Sterrett [2 Watts, 327]-frequently referred to and affirmed-in which the upper owner charged
the lower with backing the water upon his wheel, and the
latter claimed that his proper share of the water was withheld, it was decided that no action lay for the reasonable
holding of the stream by the upper owner, but that any unreasonable or malicious deprivation is actionable.
New cases arising from development and improvement
involve the riparian rights of railroad companies, as in
Pennsylsania Railroad Company v. Miller [112 Pa., 34],
it was held that while a railroad could not take water from
a flowing stream to such an extent as to damage the lower
owner, and that as an upper riparian owner it had no right
to diminish the stream, it could do so under its power of
eminent domain by making just compensation.
In the case of the Asylum for the Chronic Insane near
Womclsdorf [Ficber v. Deibert, 22 Sup. 362], it was held
that an institution comprising* a thousand employees and
inmates had the same rights as a community of like population located on the banks of the stream:
"All those who lawfully occupy riparian lands have a
right to the ordinary use of the water of the stream for the
purpose of supplying their natural wants, including drinking, washing, cooking and about their habitations for such
things as are necessary to the preservation of life and
health. This natural right is not dependent upon whether
the dwellers by the stream occupy homes or hospitals, are
sheltered by tents, or live in the open * * * , but the
asylum cannot take water to operate a fountain, nor for the
manufacture of ice to be sold away from the premises."
In Brown. v. Kistler [i9o Pa., 499], an upper riparian
owner was adjudged the right to use the water not only for
domestic purposes for watering stock, but for manufactur-
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ing purposes to a reasonable extent, even though the lower
owner should be injured thereby.
Interesting legal questions peculiar to rural conditions
was the locus of an injury caused by a municipal corporation taking lands in one county and working an alleged injury felt only in another jurisdiction. If the damage was
the cause of the legal action must it be sued for where the
injury was experienced? Aid if so and a municipal corporation can be sued in a State court only in the county in
which it is located, the victim of a wrong seemed to be in
the equivocal position of the hungry ass between two
bundles of hay. In another case, where a Pennsylvania corporation, with the right of eminent domain, took water
from a Pennsylvania stream, diminishing the water power
of a Maryland corporation, the jurisdiction for recovery
gave rise to questions of novel interest. [Octoraro Water
Co. Cases XXIII, Lancaster Law Review, 196.]
It was held by President Judge Landis, of. Lancaster
County-one of the most capable and typical of the "country judges," who adorn the Pennsylvania bench-that as
"'a State cannot condemn beyond its own limits," a Pennsylvania water company taking water from a stream that
would naturally flow into Maryland is not entitled to have
the damages assessed by viewers.
In Dark v. Johnston [55 Pa., 164], it was held that-as
the grant of water passes nothing for-which ejectment will
lie-oil is not the subject of property except in actual
occupancy.
Haldeman v. Bruckart [45 Pa., 514); Lybe's Appeal
[LO6 Pa., 626], and Williams v. Ladezu [161 Pa., 283],
are interesting cases on the subject of injuries caused to the
subterranean supply of water by the lawful acts of a landowner when the stream is not well defined or easily. discernible and when the injury is not caused by negligence or
malice; but in Whitley v. Baugh [25 Pa., 528], it is intimated that if any distinct watercourse, leading to the point
where the stream was tapped, could be ascertained and it
should appear that it could have been preserved without
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material detriment to the owner of the land through which
it flowed, the destruction of it might be attributed to malice
or negligence.
Had Judge Sharswood been to the miller "manner born,"
lie could not have better understood the mutual rights and
equal equities of a fulling mill and a grist mill, on opposite
sides of the same creek, than he expressed them in Lindernan
v. Lindscy [69 Pa., 93].
Admiralty practice and the laws of piers and wharves
and tides and navigation--except rafting-were practically
unknown to the country lawyer; but the litigation over water
rights, the swell of the stream upon meadow lands, the
backing of the water upon a neighbor's or a competitor's
mill-wheel and other legal incidents of the use and abuse of
rural water powers, had once a significance, as occasions
for law-suits, that has almost passed away.
THE LAW OF THE FARM.

Of course the questions that arise peculiarly in regions
mainly agricultural have always been characteristic of the
country lawyer's practice. Notwithstanding they often
involve comparatively trifling amounts of money, they have
been urged with a fervor that is sometimes lacking in the
colder conflict of large commercial and corporate interests.
For reasons indicated at the outset and which readily suggest themselves to the student of English law, the customs
that are related to the tillage of the soil, to its ownership,
occupation and use, for the support of human and animal
life, run far down to the tap roots of our jurisprudence.
Two great races that contributed most to the making of our'
commonwealth in its interior have been in turn its farmers;
the country lawyer who has been fortunately placed to distinguish their marked racial differences has found endless
variety in the study of their several qualities as litigant and
client. The typical Scotch-Irishman loves a law suit, "bullyrags" his lawyer and hates to pay fees; while the patient,
plodding and thrifty Pennsylvania German is averse to litigation, but is as submissive to his attorney in the direction
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of the case, as he is content with the fee charged. As claimants in the Orphans' Court they are especially large-minded
and free-handed; and in the distinct Pennsylvania German
sections of Eastern Pennsylvania the practice in that court
has a relative importance and value that attaches to it nowhere else. Incidentally, I remark, that for a nisi prius
judge the temperament of this race seems to be a quality of
success; and while few of that numerous and deserving
people have reached the appellate courts of the State, as
Coinmon Pleas judges a large number have attained most
honorable distinction and have displayed that genius of common sense, which, with conmoii honesty, goes far to the
making of an uncommon common pleas judge.
Tenacious of lands since Tacitus praised them, and as
jealous of its possession as when Dr. Rush rather superciliously criticized them-the protection of the soil and the
preservation and increase of its fertility have always been
an inspiration to litigation where the most advanced farmer
folk settled and stayed. The laws of descent and distribution are, of course, common, but I suspect the fastening of
the widow's statutory dower upon lands-sometimes three
or four such charges attaching to one tract; the apportionment of them, as sub-divisions, are made, are much more
frequent in the country districts; they often create great
perplexities of title and dubious issues in final distribution.
The laying out and vacation of public roads often rack a
rural community with lasting feuds and have given rise to
a great body of law upon views, reviews and re-reviews
which has little practical interest for the city specialists.
Division and line fences have ever been a fruitful source of
litigation over comparatively trifling interests; but loyalty
to a farmer client, especially, exacts from the leisure of acountry lawyer that he give the subject comprehensive study
and diligent attention. Copious illustrations of this appear
especially in the earlier reports, and some of the opinions
reflect the rural. training of the judges who wrote them.
In Dysarts v. Leeds [2 Pa., 488]. a "per cur." handed
down when Gibson was Chief Justice, and his associates
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were Rogers, Kennedy, Sergeant and Burnside, it was held
that a partition fence may be erected by either owner at
pleasure, and his occupation of the requisite land of his
neighbor for that purpose is not adverse, but by'permission.
When the owner of the adjoining tract clears, and encloses
to a fence already erected on the boundary line, he may
insert the rails of his new fence into the partition fence, and
if they project a short distance the injury falls within the
maxim de minimis, &c.
In Rangicr v. McCrcight [27 Pa., 95], Lowrie held that
where neither party insists upon such a common partition
fence they were presumed to have mutually agreed so to
occupy their respective parts that it be not needed; and
where one insisted upon putting up his share of the partition fence and the other refused to do so, injury by his
neighbor's cattle going upon his land, was held to be the
result of his own negligence and he could not recover
damages.
McCoy. v. Hance [28 Pa., 149], reaffirming Judge Huston in Martz v. Hartley, laid down the doctrine that although
paper titles called for a straight line between acknowledged
landmarks, a crooked fence which had stood for more than
twenty years constituted the legal line. Judge Huston's
knowledge of the laws of forestry, as well as of human
nature, supplied the court with judicial notice in that case.
He said: "After the lapse of many years, line trees are not
found, and nobody who knows anything about it expects to
find them. Trees die as well as men; are liable to wind and
fire; and, like men, are sometimes maliciously destroyed;
the line as used and established by consent, as designated by
fences, seen and acknowledged by both parties, the admission
of a fact, as that a corner stood at a particular spot, and
proof that both parties have admitted it for twenty-one
years, is conclusive; so much so, that positive proof, the
truth of which all admit, will not move a fence between two
fields, which their owners have admitted for twenty-one
years to be a line between them."
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The law of way-going crops is more in vogue on the
Conestoga and Pequea than at Broad and Chestnut; and yet
it has at all times engaged the struggle of minds as clear
and vigorous as those which now wrestle with trust and
transit problems.
I can conceive of a man graduating with honor from the
University Law School who did not distinguish why one
can shoot his neighbor's peaceful pigeons with impunity, but
dare not kill his noisy guineas, squawking pea fowl or crowing game cod.; and one may even pass the harrowing examination of the State Board of Law Examiners without altogether comprehending the length and breadth and height
and depth of what a country lawyer understands by a fence,
"horse high, bull strong and hog tight." Mr. Olyphant's
"Bob, Son of Battle," is a noble tribute to a noble race; but
the diligent student of Pennsylvania law will have to look to
the cases from "up the State" to see what the great jurists
have laid down as to the rights and wrongs of sheep-killing
dogs.
Even a judge without horticultural experience might be
excused for failure to take jidicial notice that "yellows"
was a disease of the peach tree, contagious and dangerous to
the community [State v. Main, 69 Conn., 123]; while a
man might practice law for a long time on the village green
without being able to decide the important question on
which the Supreme Court of the United States reversed
itself over night, at the instance of several of its housewives,
viz., whether a preparation of anchwies was a "sauce" or
"prepared fish." [Boyle v. Magone, 152 U. S., 623.]
Ignorance of the law that grass is neither an emblement
nor a way-going crop would not utterly disqualify a patent
attorney; it might not materially prejudice a young lawyer
whose ambition was limited to the bankruptcy court to forget that in Reiff v. Reiff [64 Pa., 135], the Court said: "It
may be admitted that Indian corn, wheat, rye, oats, buckwheat and potatoes and even hemp, Hungarian grass, flax
and millet are included among the emblements that do not
pass to the remainderman, but all of these are annual pro-
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ducts; when cut the root dies. It is not so with clover, timothy and meadow grass."
But no lawyer froni town, country or suburb is less a lawyer because he understands the judicial processes by which
corn, hay and oats are pronounced personal property, while
organic fertilizer of domestic production is made to smell
sweeter by the judicial nomenclature which pronounces it
real real estate. This, of course, in a country barnyard.
Like some of the rest of us, it makes much more dignified
presentation when it comes to town, and, therefore, the
sweepings of a city livery stable have been held to be personalty [Daniels v. Pond, 38 Mass., 367; 21 Pickering,
367.]
The severance of crops and the transition of realty into
personalty by such severance often presents unique problems to the country lawyer. If wheat is a way-going crop,
what is grass sown with the wheat, to be cut next year? Is
manure a way-going crop, or is it part of the freehold? In
one case [32 AtI., 2o8], -where there seemed to be an intention to reserve it for the whole farm, it was held not to pa-s
with a small section on which it was piled. In another
[Lewis v. Jones, 17 Pa., 262], where a tenant leased a
small farm of twenty acres and bought grain for his cows,
the court refused to charge that, even though the tenant
left as much manure on the farm as could be produced from
the produce of the farm itself when fed, he was entitled to
the rest.
TYPICAL COUNTRY LAWYERS.

Were there no limitations upon my time, nor even upon
your patience, 1 might enlarge upon these illustrations of
phases of practice which aforetime at least were peculiarly
within the range of the country lawyer. The law of paupers
supported by outdoor relief, their settlement and removal
in many counties of the State, have furnished noteworthy
cases; with their discussion are associated some of the
brightest minds of the profession, and to their determination
eminent judges have brought high learning and rare practical wisdom.
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Did the privileges of this occasion or the scope of this
paper permit it, personal contrasts would more vividly illustrate the distinctions between the experience of the country
lawyer and his more fortunate city brother. In the earlier
days of the Supreme Court-a place which is the very fit
goal of a Pennsylvania lawyer's highest ambition-its members were necessarily more largely drawn from the city
bar; but later they have been rather evenly distributed. The
same is true of the office of Attorney General. It is for
others to say whether either class-so far as they can be
classified-suffers by con)arison. Of those whose faces
look down upon my own daily work, from Mr. Campbell's
gallery of engravings, I regard Gibson and Black, and
of the associate justices within my own recollection I
should single out judges Dean and Clarke as typical of the
country bar and Sharswood and Tilghman as types of the
city bred lawyer. It is, however, the proud heritage of the
profession that as a court it has never been warped by sectional bias, and as conditions changed and new questions
arose its members have been found fit to meet them; "the
expansive property of the common law" and the administration of justice under the Pennsylvania system have tended
to make no loyal lawyer of liberal culture in his profession
ill at ease in any of its courts. Nothing could better illustrate the rapid obliteration of the old demarcations than the
frequency with which lawyers of reputation from large cities
and their contemporaries from interiors of the commonwealth are engaged in the same case-albeit it has been
observed as to the judiciary that the Macedonian cry for
help more frequently goes out from than into the sadly
overworked and grievously underpaid judiciary of Philadelphia!
Kaul v. Weed [203 Pa., 586], was a case in which the
leader of the Philadelphia bar-which, of course, means
leadership of the American bar-met one whom if it were
not invidious to praise the living, I should pronounce the
typical country lawyer of his day. The case is interesting
as determining the construction of what is covered by a
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grant of "timber," when at the time of the contract there
were no chemical or pulp factories in the country at which
trees of a certain size and variety were marketable. The
decision of the case loses nothing from the fact that the
opinion of the court below, by a representative country
judge, was affirmed in an opinion by a vigorous member of
the appellate court whose splendid training for his present
place was exclusively and peculiarly that of a "country
lawyer."
The mind of man is broadened by the process of the
suns. No Philadelphia lawyer any longer thinks the Schuylkill is the western boundary of the commonwealth; he
knows it stretches far beyond Bryn Mawr-way out to
Cambridge Springs. Nothing better illustrates this than
the story that when the single objection made to the elevation of that brilliant jurist who was so soon translated from
the bench of your city to our bench of the State, was that
he lacked a knowledge of the law of the anthracite fields, he
declared his willingness to spend his vacation in a coal mine
if that experience could add anything to his equipment for
the place to which he was so fitly called and which he so
completely fills.
OPPORTUNITIES ARE EQUAL.

In the labors and emoluments of the profession "honors
are easy" between town and country. Opportunity knocks
at their gates alternately; there are everywhere comparatively few who are alert to its call; and the conditions of
success are substantially the same. To the average man of
ability, industry and integrity a measure of success is probably, better assured in the smaller field; and yet the very
highest distinction is not there so readily attained. The
country lawyer is less apt to become a national figure as a
lawyer, because as a rule his practice in the Federal Courts
is quite limited. The personal equation enters far more
largely into the experience of the rural practitioner. He
shares his client's cause more intimately and there is, to
many temperaments, real joy in the closer relation to client,
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court and jury. Political ambition is more apt to be a fatal
lure. The fact that harder work often brings less substantial reward is no cause of despair to the true professional
spirit. I have known at least a half dozen men come to the
bar to which my own practice has been mostly limited, from
other bailiwicks, penniless and friendless, and within two
decades they attained its leadership and amassed fortune
enough to satisfy even avarice. I do not think any one of
these- and among them were James Buchanan and Thad-*
deus Stevens-was ever admitted to and none of them ever
practiced in the Supreme Court of the United States.
There has just been published this week, for the first time,
I think, a letter written in June, 186I, by a country lawyer
and judge, who had gathered at forty the very highest honors of the bench and bar, and upon his retirement from office
he admitted a debt of $2000 to his patron and friend, and
solicited an additional loan of $15oo. He subsequently settled in a country town, and, during the next twenty years,
made a million dollars in fees and never even had an office
except "in his hat."
The laboi saving-and perhaps the labor making-devices of the modern law office have, of course, reached far
into the back country; but the day is not remotely past when
the country lawyer had the benefit of that useful discipline
which comes from the laborious drawing of legal instruments-an exercise, by the way, that .is better for the unoccupied leisure of a tyro at the bar than baseball, bridge
whist or pink teas.
To one stately figure who in past years towered, Saul-like,
in the company of country lawvers, the profession owes the
introduction of what are known as printed paper books--to the absence of them in the Supreme Court Chief Justice
Mitchell rather inquiringly refers in the address from which
I have before quoted. I have learned that the late Joshua
W. Comly, a big lawyer in the little county of Montour,
first used them. When he was admitted to the bar of the
Supreme Court, in 1833, it was the practice for the counsel
for the plaintiff in error to make out in writing one copy
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of the record of the case as returned by the lower court, including, of course, the evidence and everything else which
the latter court made part of the tecord, for each of the
judges of the Supreme Court, and one copy for the counsel
for the defendant in erro- (making in his time six copies
altogether), with a copy of the assignment of errors attached to each. These were delivered when the case was
called for argument, and the counsel for the plaintiff in
error used the copy of the record returned by the lower
court as his or their paper book. The making out of the
six copies, especially when much evidence was made part
of the record, required a deal of labor and time to make and
was very inadequately paid for, and as Comly could not
afford to keep a clerk is was to him, as he himself says, "a
personal bore of great magnitude." Some time about 1841
he took the stand that he would make out one copy for the
printer and that all his paper books should thereafter be
printed. All the paper books he made Out for the July Term,
1842, including the case of Ash v. Ashton [3 W. & S., 510],
and Moorehead v. The Wiest Branch Bank [Idem, 550], and
such unreported cases as he argued for the plaintiff in error
at the 1842 term, were printed, and were the first ever submitted-certainly in the then Northern District. The
printed copies pleased the judges of the Supreme Court, and
the next year many other lawyers had their paper books
printed.
As this all too discursive and protracted paper must end
suddenly somewhere, may I not close with the brief tribute
of one great representative of our class to another, gone
before. In a letter written by Simon P. Wolverton, in
answer to an inquiry for something more about Comly, he
says: "When I came to the bar, in 1862, Mr. Comly was
employed in every case of any importance in this region,
on either one side or the other. He was a thorough lawyer,
and one of the ablest I ever knew, and did as much to make
a lawyer of me as any other one at the bar, because when
he was on the other side I had no peace of mind until the
case was over. At that time it was not so easy to get to
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the jury as now. He was an excellent pleader and would
chase you around with demurrers until you became very
tired. I have spent many a night in my office to get ready
to meet him next morning, and was always anxious to be
with him, which I was in many cases, to prepare the case,
as he generally expected young counsel to do. He was the
soul of honor, a man of the strictest integrity and who would
not tolerate dishonesty eyen with his clients, and I have seen
him abandon a case at bar when lie found his client had
deceived him. While he made no pretence to be a Christian,
as generally understood, I believe he was as good as any of
them, and a better Christian than many. He once said to
me at the funeral of
, that if he came to the
parting of the roads ail saw the names of deceased and a
lot more like him that he knew, on the road where the finger
boards pointed to Hell, and many others on the road where
the finger boards pointed to Heaven. he would say that
some scamp had been tampering with the finger boards. And
this is what I think of him in a similar position. If his
name was not on the board pointing to Heaven, I should say
somebody had been tampering with the sign posts."
And of such is the great empire of the country bar!

